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Hitoshi NAGAI (Nihon University)
Why Isn’t Consciousness Real? (2)
Day 2: Why Are We Zombies?
The contrast between the phenomenal and the psychological is progressive.
This lecture will be based on the problem raised by David Chalmers in The Conscious 
Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). I would like to develop the problem in what I 
think is the right direction, the direction we outlined in the first lecture. In my view, Chalmers 
should have developed his argument in this direction. In the course of this second lecture, 
however, details left out in the first lecture will be filled in by the use of his problem setting. 
The central theme will be the true meaning of the concept of a ‘zombie’. I would like to 
begin by expounding Chalmers’ argument.
Chalmers’ argument starts from the distinction between the ‘phenomenal’ and 
‘psychological’ concepts of a mind. It corresponds to the distinction between ‘consciousness’ 
and a ‘mind’ in the previous lecture. Put most simply, the distinction is that between the 
private and public aspects of a ‘mind’ in the broad sense of the word. Chalmers puts it as 
follows:
When we wonder whether somebody is having a color experience, we are not wonder-
ing whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain 
way. We are wondering whether they are experiencing a color sensation, and this is a 
distinct question. (The Conscious Mind, p. 15, original italics)
By ‘experience’ Chalmers is referring to the ‘phenomenal’ aspect. All functions of a mind 
could have a role in causal relations even without being accompanied by an ‘experience’. Yet 
they are accompanied by experiencing for some reason, and this, according to Chalmers, is 
the problem.
Take a ‘pain’, for example. What if this had all the functions of a pain, and yet lacked 
the phenomenal quality of pain? A person of whom this is true would be, as it were, a ‘pain 
zombie’. He could have psychological pain but no phenomenal pain. (If we say that he 
feels psychological pain but no phenomenal pain, it would be that the word ‘feel’, too, has 
both the phenomenal and psychological meanings.) It is crucial to understand this contrast 
properly. Perception, for example, can be understood as a purely psychological process. For 
even a robot without consciousness could avoid obstacles to reach a destination, or perform 
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other actions by perceiving the environment. It could also obey the command ‘Bring me a 
red piece of chalk’. Our perception, in contrast, is accompanied by phenomenal qualities. If a 
certain phenomenal quality is missing, the perceiver would be a zombie with respect to that 
quality. What Chalmers calls a ‘zombie’ is a human (or a human-like creature) that lacks all 
phenomenal qualities, thereby lacking consciousness itself. We will discuss the details later.
Concepts of mental phenomena can be divided into those for which the phenomenal 
aspect is essential and those for which the psychological aspect is essential. Sensations are 
among the former, and perception and thinking are among the latter. So, whereas sensations 
can dispense with psychological causal relations, perception and thinking can dispense 
with phenomenal qualities. But this only means that particular phenomenal qualities are not 
essential for there to be particular instances of perception or thinking, but not that perception 
or thinking can lack them altogether. There is no phenomenal quality peculiar to mentally 
calculating the sum of two and five, or the feel of ‘2+5’, (or even if there were, it would not 
play an essential role). But it does not follow that the subject may lack consciousness.
I already have a small question at this stage. It leads to an immense problem. Chalmers 
discusses the contrast between the phenomenal and the psychological. Although this contrast 
might be actually vivid and valid for him, who is speaking of it, how does he already 
know that the same is true for those to whom he is speaking? That is, how does he know 
that there is the same contrast for others? Why is it presupposed that the contrast between 
the phenomenal and the psychological survives beyond the contrast between himself and 
others? I think that he fails to ask this most important question. It seems to me that the 
communication by language has transformed the phenomenal into the psychological, or 
into the phenomenal subsumed under psychological concepts. I suspect that the linguistic 
communication has downgraded Chalmers’ contrast into a contrast between psychological 
concepts.
This can be viewed in a converse manner, which is more precise. The contrast is actually 
living and effective for me, who read and understood Chalmers, and precisely because of 
this, I cannot share with anyone else the contrast I grasp by myself. If so, Chalmers’ own 
contrast, from which I learned the contrast, would have already been downgraded into a 
contrast between psychological concepts. This means that the contrast inevitably incorporates 
a progression with the following structure.
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Only at the top row is the contrast actually living and operating. As it were, the rows below 
it, which repeat it by language, are merely its shadows in a cave. So although the contrast 
is living and effective for me, the content that I can communicate by talking like this now 
naturally falls into the second or lower row. It must be downgraded into a contrast between 
psychological concepts when communicated.
In my view, it is the essence of the contrast that it inevitably incorporates such a 
progress. I have said, ‘It is crucial to understand this contrast properly’. But, in fact, it 
cannot be understood ‘properly’. For it is indeterminable at which level the contrast is to be 
understood, and this gives the contrast an unstable structure. My view is that this progression 
of the contrast is precisely where the essence of the concept ‘consciousness’ is hidden. What 
is invented in order to lay all contrasts in the same plane is the general concept of a ‘self’, 
which I discussed in the previous lecture.
Before I said, ‘It is crucial to understand this contrast properly’, I said the following: ‘If 
we say that he feels a psychological pain but no phenomenal pain, it would be that the word 
‘feel’, too, has both the phenomenal and psychological meanings’. However, if the word 
‘feel’ has both phenomenal and psychological meanings, is it not rather natural that the word 
‘phenomenal’ itself has a double meaning? If so, is it not that the same is true of ‘experience’, 
‘consciousness’, ‘qualia’ and so on?
What happens when reading Chalmers’ discussion of the contrast in question is in 
fact the same as what happens when reading Descartes’ doubt and his conclusion ‘I think, 
therefore I am’. Descartes says that even if everything is doubted, the existence of the ‘I’ 
who is doubting cannot be doubted. Is Descartes’ ‘I think (or I doubt)’ phenomenal? Or 
is it psychological? This question is of the same kind as the question I have just posed to 
Chalmers.
We are now naturally led to the analogy with time that we developed in the last lecture. 
Phenomenal Psychological
Phenomenal Psychological
Phenomenal Psychological
(This goes on endlessly.)
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Below is a simplified version of a diagram I used in The Opening: A Philosophy of Actuality 
(Philosophia OSAKA, No. 3, 200, p. 23).
Past Present
(This goes on endlessly.)
Future
Past Present Future
Pa. Pr. Fu. Pa. Pr. Fu.
Past Present Future
Pa. Pr. Fu. Pa. Pr. Fu.
Let us briefly explain the diagram. The ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ of the top row are 
actual. However, as we said in the previous lecture, there was a present time at any time in 
the past, or will be a present time at any time in the future, with a past and future centred at 
that present time. This is expressed by the rows below the top one, which are repeated ad 
infinitum. We have discussed the problem about this understanding of time.
Here let us analogize the ‘present’ with the ‘phenomenal’, and the ‘past’ and ‘future’ 
with the ‘psychological’. Then the top row in the first diagram corresponds to the top row 
in the above diagram. That the ‘phenomenal’ spoken of by Chalmers transforms into a class 
under psychological concepts corresponds to the ‘present’ dropping below the top row such 
that a present time in the past and a present time in the future also have to be ‘present’. In 
both cases, what is actual and absolute degenerates and transforms into what is possible and 
relative. To say that it ‘degenerates’ and ‘transforms’ does not mean that what happens here 
should be criticized, but rather that it should be noted.
What separates logical supervenience and natural supervenience 
We have presented the viewpoint from which we will critically reconstruct Chalmers’ 
theory. Before we proceed, however, there are still points to be introduced. In what follows, 
we will clarify what ‘supervenience’ means.
If, in all possible situations, the property A cannot be absent so long as there is the 
property B, the property A supervenes on the property B. To consider the world as a whole, 
global supervenience can be defined as follows: If there is no world in which the property A 
is absent and the property B exists, the property A supervenes on the property B. For example, 
if a world physically identical to our world also has to be biologically identical to our world, 
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biological properties supervene on physical properties. Thus, if consciousness supervenes on 
physical facts, two creatures in a strictly identical physical state will have a strictly identical 
conscious experience.
At this point, Chalmers draws an important distinction between logical supervenience 
and natural supervenience. If, in all logically possible situations, the property A exists so 
long as there is the property B, the property A logically supervenes on the property B. If, 
additionally, the property A exists so long as there is the property B in all naturally possible 
situations, the property A naturally supervenes on the property B. While natural possibility 
concerns what is possible within the restrictions of the laws of nature governing our world, 
logical possibility simply concerns what is logically possible with no such restrictions. 
Hence, there are plenty of things that are logically possible and naturally impossible, but 
nothing can be naturally possible and logically impossible.
According to Chalmers, biological properties logically supervene on physical 
properties. That is, no two worlds can be physically identical and biologically different. If 
photosynthesis is occurring in a world, the same photosynthesis must be occurring in another 
physically identical world. In addition, psychological properties also logically supervene on 
physical properties. No two worlds can be physically identical and psychologically different. 
If there is a world in which an organism is perceiving in a psychological sense, then in 
another physically identical world with that same organism in it, it would be perceiving too. 
However, according to Chalmers, the fact that there is a conscious experience in a world 
does not necessarily mean that there is a conscious experience in another physically identical 
world. Consciousness, unlike psychological properties, does not logically supervene on 
physical properties. The supervenience relationship between consciousness and physical 
facts is not a logical or conceptual relationship, but is a natural and contingent one. For if a 
psychological functional model explains how pain arises, for example, one can always pose 
the question why such a function accompanies that sensation of pain. (This will be important 
later when it is used as the grounds for the claim that a zombie does not actually exist but is 
logically possible.)
The difference between logical and natural supervenience may be clearer if we imagine 
God’s creation of the world. If the property A logically supervenes on the property B, then 
God’s creating a world in which there is the property B would thereby entail there being 
the property A in the world. But where God created a world with the property B where the 
property A only naturally supervenes on property B, God would have needed to additionally 
create a law to make the property A supervene on the property B. According to Chalmers, 
materialism is right if we take the property B as physical properties and the property A as 
all other properties, and if God need not have performed additional creation as in the former 
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case above.
Two objections could be made to Chalmers’ view from two opposite directions. One 
objection is that consciousness logically supervenes on the physical. The other is that 
consciousness does not even naturally supervene on the physical. (The materialist could 
reply that it would be enough for materialism if consciousness naturally supervenes on the 
physical, but I do not see any significance in this objection.) I will simultaneously support 
these two opposite objections later.
What is most remarkable at this stage is that one can ask why any function accompanies 
that sensation of pain. Why is this question possible at all? What is ‘that’ sensation of pain 
like? How could one know that people feel ‘that’ pain? I cannot help but suspect that there is 
groundless conjecture here. I very much wonder why Chalmers and many other philosophers 
do not probe into this most essential point. In fact, this point is critically effective in the 
dispute over the possibility of zombies, covertly serving as the grounds of the arguments. In 
those disputes, too, the groundless generalization of ‘that’ plays an essential role. For unless 
it does, the general ‘phenomenal pain’ would not exist, and pain has to be assimilated to 
psychological pain, which is explainable in terms of its causal function. Thus the point here 
is crucial, and requires extremely careful handling.
Turning two-dimensional semantics into three-dimensional semantics
What does it mean to simultaneously support the two opposite objections? To clarify 
this, we need to introduce another point put forward by Chalmers – i.e. his two-dimensional 
semantics.
Chalmers’ argument is founded on Kripke’s. Kripke drew a sharp distinction between the 
epistemological contrast between the a priori (i.e. knowable before empirical investigation) 
and the a posteriori (i.e. knowable by empirical investigation), on the one hand, and the 
metaphysical contrast between the necessary (i.e. that which cannot be otherwise) and the 
contingent (i.e. that which can be otherwise), on the other hand. This distinction is very 
important. On the face of it, the a priori coincides with the necessary whilst the a posteriori 
coincides with the contingent, and that had been thought to be the case.
According to Kripke, there are necessary truths that cannot be known a priori, examples 
of which are ‘Water is H2O’ and ‘Heat is molecular motion’. They were known a posteriori, 
that is, as a result of empirical investigation, but once known, a reversal occurs (as discussed 
in the first lecture) such that water is H2O in all possible worlds; they become necessary 
truths. Then, the fact that water is that sort of clear and drinkable liquid, which fills lakes and 
rivers and falls from the sky, is demoted to a contingent fact, although it has been a priori. 
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That wateriness of water appearing to us becomes a property that the real essence of water, i.e. 
H2O, only happens to have.
The following point should be noted: what is meant by ‘that’ here, unlike in the case 
of the phenomenal qualities of pain, sourness, etc., is not private. It is not that individual 
persons describe their own private sensation using ‘that’, but that we, the inhabitants of this 
world, describe the way water is in our own world using ‘that’. The privacy is not privacy 
among persons, but, as it were, privacy among worlds. We must not confuse them. (This 
concerns the contrast between primary and pre-primary intensions that we mentioned in the 
first lecture. We will discuss it in detail later.) Nevertheless, the demonstrative ‘that’ here is 
indispensable. For, after all, water is that kind of thing.
In the semantics of Kripke and Chalmers, the way the reference is fixed depends on 
whether we consider the actual world or counterfactual possible worlds. In other words, a 
concept has two kinds of intension. The primary intension, which is epistemological, is a 
relation that fixes the reference to the actual world, and is determined by the way the world 
actually is. The secondary intension, which is metaphysical, is a relation that fixes the 
reference to possible worlds. When the reference in the actual world is already determined, 
the secondary intension, by presupposing it, determines the reference in counterfactual 
worlds. In the case of ‘water’, its primary intension picks out that sort of clear and drinkable 
liquid that fills lakes and rivers. If it is discovered to be XYZ in the actual world, then ‘water’ 
refers to XYZ. But if it is discovered to be H2O, then ‘water’ refers to H2O. This is the 
secondary intension. Then it is no longer possible for water not to be H2O. A world in which 
there is no H2O is a world with no water, even if there is something that has that kind of 
watery appearance. However, the opposite was the case at the stage of the primary intension; 
water might not have been H2O. The liquid was clear and drinkable, and was grasped as such 
a thing, so it might not have been H2O. But once there is the second intension, a reversal 
occurs such that it becomes possible for water, which is H2O, not to be watery in that kind of 
manner. This is Kripke’s (and Putnam’s) account.
We briefly discussed the reason why this conversion occurs in the previous lecture. The 
reason, to put it more generally here, is that we have the desire to locate in the world the 
way the world appears to us, making it something that is not the world itself, or something 
contingent about the world itself. More precisely, the reason is that the device we developed 
and call language, in essence, is a mechanism that inevitably contains the tendency towards 
the same direction as that desire.
Now, according to Chalmers, because the primary intension, though not necessary, is 
a priori, it is determined independently of the way the world really is, which is known by 
investigation. Then, it is possible to bring the ‘necessary-contingent’ relation back to the 
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epistemological stage, superimposing it on the ‘a priori-a posteriori’ relation. For example, 
we can regard the fact that water is a clear and drinkable liquid as a fact about the actual 
world, and can regard different ways in which that fact can be discovered to be as possible 
worlds. This enables us to conceive of the possibility that the clear and drinkable water was 
not H2O but XYZ. That ‘water is that clear and drinkable liquid’ (or that ‘heat is that hot 
thing’) becomes an a priori necessary truth. It is not relevant to consider here how the actual 
world has really been discovered to be. Whatever way the actual world is discovered to be, it 
is an a posteriori contingent truth, because it is merely the way the world happens to be.
The above line of thought allows us to think as follows: if that water was actually 
discovered to be XYZ rather than H2O, water would be XYZ in that actual world, and so 
would be XYZ in all possible worlds conceived of in that actual world (which is a possible 
actual world). We become able to think of the relation between the actual world and possible 
worlds as a possible relation. That is the respect in which the present way of thinking is 
advantageous, but it is undeniable that, in another respect, it is a superficial grasp of the 
world. What is a priori in our knowledge, e.g. that ‘Murasaki Shikibu wrote The Tale of 
Genji’, ipso facto becomes necessary, so we will not be able to deal with the possibility 
that the person named Murasaki Shikibu had not written The Tale of Genji. This possibility 
corresponds to the possibility that H2O did not appear that way (i.e. in such a way that we 
could recognize it as water). Such things become simply impossible.
To sum up in Chalmers’ terms, it is logically possible but metaphysically impossible that 
water is not H2O, whereas it is logically impossible but metaphysically possible that water 
does not appear that way. (It seems to me that it would be precise and clear if we replace 
‘logically’ with ‘epistemologically’.)
We can now link the two-dimensional semantics to supervenience. There is logical 
supervenience based on the primary intension and that based on the secondary intension. 
Chalmers denies the logical supervenience of consciousness on physical properties by 
treating it as based on the primary intension. We will discuss this in more detail in relation to 
the problem of zombies (p. 60).
Things that do not supervene on the physical except ‘consciousness’: indexical facts
According to Chalmers, nearly everything except consciousness (i.e. phenomenal 
properties, experiences, or qualia) logically supervenes on the physical. If God creates 
the world physically, everything else, through supervening on it, automatically comes into 
existence. What Chalmers regards as candidates for things that do not logically supervene 
on the physical are: (1) conscious experiences, (2) indexical elements and (3) causality. 
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Before we proceed, I would like to explain (2) and (3). We will then return to the problem of 
consciousness, relating it to zombies.
Indexicals are such words as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’ and ‘tomorrow’, whose references vary 
with the speaker and the context of the utterance. ‘Here’ means ‘the place at which I am’, 
and ‘tomorrow’ means ‘the day after the one which exists now’, so, ultimately, ‘I’ and 
‘now’ are essential indexicals. But why do they not supervene on physical properties? If ‘I’ 
could be understood as ‘the one who is making this utterance’, namely as ‘the reflectively 
conscious utterer’, ‘I’ would supervene on physical properties. It would be that even a purely 
mechanical robot could utter the word ‘I’ and refer to the robot itself. The same would hold 
for ‘now’. If ‘now’ could be understood as ‘the time at which this utterance is made’, ‘now’ 
would supervene on physical properties. Even a purely mechanical robot would be able to 
utter ‘now’ and refer to the time of the utterance. Chalmers, however, does not think this way. 
In fact, he has in mind the meaning of ‘I’ and ‘now’ which I explained by describing them 
as ‘sole’ and ‘actual’ in the first lecture, distinguishing it from the other meaning. (See The 
Conscious Mind, p. 85, ll. 6-8.) ‘I’ in this sense is ‘I’ as opposed to ‘one reflectively conscious 
of oneself’. That is why he gives ‘I’ as an example of something that does not supervene on 
the physical.
Indeed, ‘I’ and ‘now’ in this meaning do not supervene on the physical. That is plainly 
true in the case of ‘now’. A present fact ceases to be present and becomes past, remaining 
physically (or even in all respects) identical. The property of ‘being now’ does not supervene 
on anything! The same would be true of ‘I’, if the analogy we introduced in the last 
lecture holds. If there was a person who is physically identical with me (and is also even 
psychologically and phenomenally identical with me), he would not thereby become me 
– just as events that are precisely identical with those occurring now would not ipso facto 
create now. The property of ‘being me’ also does not supervene on anything. (Nevertheless, 
‘I’ or ‘now’, by the same process as that by which the primary intension converts to the 
secondary intension, can convert to the meaning that supervenes on a particular person or 
event. We will discuss this process in the next lecture.) Below is a diagram that is parallel to 
the previous two diagrams.
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I Another person
I Another person
I Another person
(This goes on endlessly.)
Of course, only at the top row is the relation between the sole actual I and another person. 
The property of ‘being me’ at the top row alone does not supervene on the physical properties 
of the world. The I’s below the top row do not concern an actual fact, but are reducible to a 
formal property, i.e. self-relatedness. So those I’s can be regarded as supervening on physical 
properties. I can say, ‘I do not supervene on physical properties’. This means, ‘The fact that 
this person is me does not supervene on this person’s physical properties’. Nevertheless, this 
statement uttered by me would be understood by others in the meaning of the second row or 
below. Then they could say, ‘It does supervene on physical properties’. (The statement: ‘The 
fact that this event is happening now does not supervene on this event’s physical properties’, 
could be criticized in the same manner at other points in time.) On the other hand, the same 
statement as uttered by me could be uttered by any other person. Then I could say, ‘It does 
supervene on physical properties’. There is no objective fact as to which contrast is at the 
top row. Rather, interpretations of the above diagram will get caught up in the conflict it 
illustrates. That is, the property of ‘being at the top row’ in the diagram is itself relativized 
in the way that ‘I’ or ‘now’ illustrated by the diagram is. Since language begins with this 
relativization (or, since language is this relativization), there remains no trace of what is 
eliminated by the relativization inside the linguistic world. However, I, and consequently we, 
always live both what is constantly eliminated by the process of linguistic relativization and 
what is constantly generated by it. In fact, this is where the reason can be found as to why the 
term ‘phenomenal’ has to have a double meaning.
What is Chalmers’ view on the relationship between the indexical facts under 
consideration and consciousness? He does not think that there is an essential relationship 
between them. He only places the two on a par with each other. I, of course, think that there 
is an essential relationship. There should be no room left for misunderstanding, but put 
that way, my thought might seem to be this: whilst even a mechanical robot could refer to 
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itself or to the time of the reference, ‘I’ or ‘now’ describable as ‘sole’ and ‘actual’ cannot 
be referred to without consciousness. This is not my view at all. It is rather the opposite: 
unless there exist the indexical elements describable as ‘sole’ and ‘actual’, there could be no 
‘consciousness’. If consciousness is not understood this way, how could it fail to supervene 
on physical properties? One who grasps ‘consciousness’ as an objective fact, as Chalmers 
and most others do, should be able to sufficiently allow it to logically supervene on physical 
properties.
Chalmers himself writes as follows:
Most obviously, there is an epistemological problem about consciousness – the prob-
lem of other minds. This problem arises because it seems logically compatible with all 
the external evidence that beings around us are conscious, and it is logically compat-
ible that they are not. We have no way to peek inside a dog’s brain, for instance, and 
observe the presence or absence of conscious experience. … [T]he mere prima facie 
existence of the problem is sufficient to defeat an epistemological argument … for the 
logical supervenience of consciousness. By contrast, there is not even a prima facie 
problem of other biologies, or other economies. (The Conscious Mind, p. 74)
It is with regard to not just dogs’ brains, but people’s brains that there is no means 
to peek inside them for the purpose of observing the presence or absence of conscious 
experience. So it is question-begging to use the pronoun ‘we’ in presenting the problem. 
However, the problem could not be publicly presented in the first place without begging 
the question. This structure carries within it the very peculiarity of the problem. Chalmers 
says that there is at least one prima facie problem, but he is not right. It is the only problem. 
The ‘problem of other minds’ is not a problem that happened to arise from consciousness. 
Rather, what generates that problem is consciousness. To use the notion of the ‘privacy of 
consciousness’, consciousness is not something that happens to have the characteristic of 
being private, but the characteristic of privacy hypostasized is consciousness. However, the 
problem of privacy here cannot be presented as a problem of general privacy possessed by all 
creatures, or as a problem lying in one plane at the same level. As I said earlier, this itself is a 
truly baffling problem, and is also the reason why the character ‘phenomenal’, for example, 
has to be progressive. Thus, if it is said, ‘Observation of the brain belonging to oneself would 
enable observation of the relationship between brain states and conscious states’, there will 
be the aforementioned double meaning of ‘oneself’. And that is the very problem.
Things that do not supervene on the physical except ‘consciousness’: causality
Let us briefly discuss the third candidate of what does not logically supervene on the 
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physical. How could a world differ from our world if it is identical with our world in every 
detail of a microphysical fact? Thus far I have given two answers on Chalmers’ behalf – i.e. 
absence of consciousnesses (or their being in a different way) and absence of myself (or my 
being a different conscious subject). I have contended that they are, in fact, not two separate 
matters. Now, the third candidate is causality.
It is true also of causality that no more than the regularity of the connections between 
events is observable externally. That is, there is a problem of causality corresponding to the 
‘problem of other minds’. If there are two worlds that are permanently identical in how all the 
particles in space-time are distributed, they may differ only in whether there is causality. A 
world without causation (which is, as it were, a causality-zombie world) is a world in which 
everything is in fact contingent. One might think that the existence of physical laws entails 
the reality of causation, but there being such patterns is compatible with everything being 
contingent. Moreover, the same problem arises as to the very existence of laws; it is possible 
for a world which is physically identical with our world throughout its spatiotemporal history 
to have a different set of laws. In Chalmers’ comic example, that world has a physical law 
which will change two hundred tons of pure gold, if assembled in a vacuum, into lead. But 
since no such thing has happened in that world, it has followed the same history as our world. 
This clearly implies that our world could be such a world. Thus, laws of nature also do not 
logically supervene on a collection of individual physical facts. Of course, there is a big 
problem of whether it is possible to separate individual physical facts from laws of nature, a 
problem stemming from a conflict between Hume and Kant. I think as follows: to the extent 
that that is impossible – and only to that extent – would the existence of causality and laws of 
nature be presupposed.
Chalmers, however, says that although the existence of causality and laws defies 
reductive explanation, the problem is not as important as that of consciousness. Whereas 
consciousness is something elusive that demands an explanation, he says, causality and laws 
are mere postulates to account for the existing physical phenomena, that is, for the regularity 
existing in the nature. But if he can say this, he should also be able to say that consciousness, 
too, is only postulated to account for the regularity existing in the nature. Why can’t he say 
this? I think that there is only one true reason. In the case of causality and laws, on the one 
hand, although there is a problem corresponding to the ‘problem of other minds’, there isn’t 
the crucial asymmetry between self and other. In the case of consciousness, on the other 
hand, I can say, ‘No matter what anyone says, I have consciousness, because I have this’. I 
can be certain of at least one instance even if no one else agrees with me, and whether other 
people also have the same kind of thing constitutes the ‘problem of other minds’. In the case 
of causality and laws, however, there exists nothing that could correspond to the sole instance 
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whose certainty is guaranteed. As it were, everything corresponds to ‘another mind’ from the 
outset. To use the terms from the previous lecture, the second counterattack is directly made 
without the first counterattack. That is why it can be safely said that causality and laws are 
only postulated to account for the existing regularity. With respect to consciousness, there 
is actually one instance given of which such a thing cannot be said. Moreover, objective 
agreement can never be reached as to which that sole instance is. In that sense, there is a most 
unusual phenomenon that is incomparable with anything else.
If so, however, it is in fact possible to see the same structure in causality and laws. As 
regards causality, the sole instance for which I can say, ‘No matter what anyone says, I know 
that this exists’, would be the causality of free will. For example, I can raise my hand, let 
out my voice, and so on. As regards laws, it would be the private semantic rules of language 
which I follow when I speak. Then causality, laws, rules and meaning would each generate a 
contrast analogous to that between the phenomenal and the psychological, and so it would be 
possible to insist that that which corresponds to the ‘phenomenal’ fails to logically supervene 
on physical properties.
Whether something supervenes on physical properties indeed has no significance outside 
the range of problems associated with Chalmers and contemporary ‘philosophy of mind’. 
A far bigger philosophical problem will be formed if we ask what the difference is between 
the idea of a zombie pertaining to consciousness or phenomenal qualities and the idea of a 
zombie pertaining to causality, laws, rules or meaning. Put another way, if I say, ‘Whatever 
anyone says, I am not a zombie’, the meaning of the validity of my certainty should be 
different between the case of consciousness and that of rules or meaning. But we will not go 
into this problem here in order not to deviate from the subject and obscure the continuity of 
the whole discussion. Hoping that my view on that problem will be clear from this series of 
lectures as a whole, I would like to go straight to the problem of zombies in its commonly 
understood sense.
Finally, here come the zombies!
Chalmers argues that it is possible for there to be a creature that is physically identical 
with me but lacks conscious experience – i.e. my zombie duplicate. Here ‘I’ is presented 
as an example of something that is certainly conscious, so anything that is conscious will 
serve his official purpose. Therefore, a global expression of the same thought would be that 
it is possible for there to be a world that is physically identical with our world but has no 
consciousness in it at all. Naturally, all the creatures in that world are zombies.
Now I will exist in that world. Let us consider that person in the world in which there is 
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no consciousness, or my zombie duplicate in a world in which there are conscious creatures. 
He is precisely identical with me down to the level of molecules. He processes information 
about the external world in the same way as I do, and responds to stimuli in the same way 
as I do. For example, he seems to enjoy the taste of beer, distinguishing it from the tastes 
of other beverages, listens to language, and speaks. He is functionally identical with me. 
However, there is something crucial lacking in him; he has no inside. Conscious experience 
is completely absent. To employ the contrast between the phenomenal and the psychological, 
although there is in fact nothing ‘phenomenal’ for him, he and I are precisely identical 
psychologically. Therefore, it is indiscernible from the outside which of us is a zombie. He 
will also say, by the same mechanism as mine, that he is not a zombie. So, although he ‘lacks 
consciousness’ in the experiential, phenomenal sense, we can say that he ‘has consciousness’ 
in the functional, psychological sense.
There is the following objection: the conceivability of something does not entail the 
possibility of it. Chalmers, in response to this objection, appeals to the point which I said I 
would discuss ‘in more detail in relation to the problem of zombies’ (p. 54). His argument 
goes as follows. In the case of a necessary phenomenon discovered a posteriori, the 
objection is right. For example, there is no longer a possibility that water is not H2O, because 
water is H2O in all possible worlds. However, a posteriori necessity is irrelevant here. For 
consciousness is the primary intension rather than the secondary intension. Just as it is 
possible that water qua the primary intension is not H2O, so it is possible that consciousness 
does not supervene on the physical states inside the body. A zombie world is impossible 
in the way that it is impossible for water qua the secondary intension not to be H2O, but is 
possible in the way that it is possible for water qua the primary intension not to be H2O. 
Chalmers regards the problem of the logical supervenience of consciousness on physical 
properties as pertaining to the primary intension, thereby denying that logical supervenience.
The above defence of zombies based on two-dimensional semantics is indeed quite 
impressive and, as a form of argument, deservers emphasis. However, it does not stand. For 
either in the case of water or in the case of heat, the primary intension is not a phenomenal 
quality, or a quale. This should be obvious in the case of water. That clear and drinkable 
liquid that fills lakes and rivers and that sometimes falls from the sky is already an objective 
‘thing’ that has been discerned from other things. Even ‘hotness’ in the case of heat, when 
it is the source of public investigation, is never a phenomenal quality, but is that property 
possessed by such things as fire, which is communally discernible by everyone. ‘That’ in 
this case does not mean ‘that’ phenomenal quality, which is meant by each person referring 
to their own private sensation, but is ‘that’ by which we, the inhabitants of this world, refer 
to the way water is in our own world. If ‘that’ here is the primary intension, the phenomenal 
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quality itself is, as it were, the pre-primary intension. Of course, the pre-primary intension 
inevitably accompanies the progressive structure. The primary intension must not be 
confused with this pre-primary intension. Even in the case of pain, sourness or yellowness, 
the primary intension, as the starting point of the investigation of the secondary intension, 
is never the pre-primary intension. Indeed, if it was, the very public investigation would be 
impossible.
In fact, the same is true of ‘consciousness’. Unless cases where consciousness exists and 
cases where it does not exist are discernible from each other communally and objectively, 
the investigation of the secondary intension of ‘consciousness’ (i.e. that of its microphysical 
essence) could not have begun. Put in terms of the distinction between the phenomenal and 
the psychological, both the primary and secondary intensions cannot but be psychological 
from the outset. That is, ‘consciousness’, from the outset, cannot but be something that even 
a zombie can have.
If so, what should be said of the ‘possibility of phenomenal zombies’ advocated by 
Chalmers? To state my answer in advance, what he intends to say, in fact, bears on the pre-
primary intension, and therefore cannot be said (unless the progressive structure is taken into 
consideration). In my view, this is essentially Wittgenstein’s insight. It is utterly puzzling that 
this truly heart-warming insight seems to have been forgotten by everyone so quickly.
Objections from two opposite directions at the same time
Do you remember when we said, in response to Chalmers’ denial that consciousness 
logically supervenes on physical properties, that two objections can be made at the same time 
from two opposite directions? We can now easily carry out the task we have been postponing. 
The two objections from opposite directions were, ‘Consciousness does logically supervene 
on the physical’, and, ‘Consciousness does not even naturally supervene on the physical’.
Let us begin with the objection that ‘consciousness does logically supervene on the 
physical’. The truth of this statement is clear from the point that even the primary intension 
of ‘consciousness’ can only be psychological. In this sense, zombies are literally utterly 
impossible. The reason is simple: even before the formation of the microphysical secondary 
intension – that is, from the outset – our concept of ‘consciousness’ is and must be objectively 
determined by, for example, whether or not it is possible to partake in the game of ‘losing 
consciousness and recovering consciousness’. Even a zombie could lose consciousness, say, 
by getting hit on the head, and recover consciousness afterwards. Therefore, a zombie has 
to have consciousness. A game of this sort is the only home of our concept ‘consciousness’. 
The investigation of the secondary intension has to be conducted on the basis of such a game. 
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Furthermore, there would not occur the ‘first counterattack’, which we dealt with in the first 
lecture. For if there occurs a situation for ‘consciousness’ corresponding to the situation 
where ‘even though I had not eaten anything sour, my mouth suddenly became full of a sour 
taste (and my face looks as if I have just eaten something spicy)’, it would be a situation 
where I am conscious but cannot behave as though I am ‘conscious’ at all. So, it would 
be completely impossible for me to report that that situation has occurred. If the opposite 
situation occurs, it would be a situation where I suddenly become a zombie. Then I would 
not be able to say that it has occurred. Even if a zombie utters that it has, there must be no 
possibility that he has said so by referring to it.
Let us turn to the objection that ‘consciousness does not even naturally supervene on the 
physical’. Chalmers, presenting the ‘problem of other minds’, says that ‘the mere prima facie 
existence of the problem is sufficient to defeat an epistemological argument … for the logical 
supervenience of consciousness’. However, if this is his argument, it would clearly apply 
to the case of the natural supervenience of consciousness. This argument should have the 
consequence that zombies are possible even naturally, let alone logically. That is, there may 
be a lot of zombies existing normally in this world, although it can never be known whether 
there are. The ‘problem of other minds’ is precisely this sort of problem, so it is simply 
puzzling that Chalmers, using the argument in question, believes without a doubt that other 
normal people in this world are conscious.
However, conversely, why could there be such an argument? If the home of the concept 
‘consciousness’ resides in whether or not it is possible to partake in the game of ‘losing 
consciousness and recovering consciousness’, it would be impossible a priori that others, in 
so far as they partake in that game, lack consciousness. Moreover, in so far as the relevant 
neurophysiological processes are occurring in others, it would be necessarily impossible 
that they are not conscious. For both the primary and secondary intensions are functional 
and psychological. Chalmers might say that there will nevertheless remain the problem of 
whether others have ‘phenomenal’ consciousness. But what is ‘phenomenal consciousness’ 
that is neither the primary nor secondary intension? What does it mean to ask whether others 
have it? The intuition is presumably as follows. ‘I certainly have this, which is consciousness. 
But do other people also have anything of this sort?’ Yet it can never be known, by definition, 
whether other people also have anything ‘of this sort’. (If this can be known, those people 
would not be others.) The possibility of others being zombies is, in that sense, necessary.
However, if the problem assumes something that cannot be known by definition, is it 
not a pseudo-problem? If we start saying that ‘other people’ do or do not have something ‘of 
this sort’, are we not giving a logical tautology or contradictory statement disguised as an 
empirical factual statement? We are. Other people do not have anything ‘of this sort’. That 
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is why they are others. Then, are others zombies? In one sense, they precisely are. Isn’t that 
right? There are people whose external behaviour and internal states of the brain and nerves 
are entirely normal, but they feel no pain, sourness, anxiety, or melancholy. Who are they? 
The answer to this riddle can only be ‘other people’. This is a simple, indubitable fact. The 
home of the concept of zombies can only reside in the eerie contrast between me and people 
who are not me. However, who are ‘other people’? Why can I, expecting approval, speak 
about this to you, other people?
The problem here, again, concerns the progressive multilayeredness of the self-
other relation. In a sense, everyone can ask, reflecting on themselves, ‘I certainly have 
consciousness, but do other people also have anything of this sort?’ It would be that I have 
also just asked this question. Just as he is ‘I’ and she is ‘I’, so I am ‘I’, and there are others 
for each of ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘I’. In this case, too, it cannot be known, by definition, whether 
others also have something ‘of this sort’, so the possibility of others being zombies is 
necessary. However, in another sense, they are not actual others. ‘I’ issuing in ‘I am “I” ’ is 
different in meaning from ‘I’ whom everyone is, therefore the meaning of ‘others’ would 
also be different. This vividly points to the relation between the progressive structure of the 
‘phenomenal’ illustrated in the diagram on p. 49 and the progressive structure of ‘I’ illustrated 
in the diagram on p. 56. Thus, the home of the concept of a zombie, and therefore that of the 
concept of ‘consciousness’, resides in the progressive self-other structure.
 (translated by Shogo SHIMIZU)
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